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“Labor unions are an indispensible element of social life in Catholic 
teaching.  No one may deny the right to organize without attacking 
human dignity itself.”1 
 *  Robert and Marion Short, Distinguished Chair in Law and Professor, University of St. 
Thomas School of Law; Fellow, Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership; Affiliate Senior Fellow, St. 
John’s University Vincentian Center for Church and Society; Research Fellow, New York 
University School of Law, Center for Labor and Employment Law; J.D. 1982, New York University 
School of Law; B.A. 1979, Georgetown University.  This Article is a part of Pepperdine University 
School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: 
Who Should Influence Whom?  The Article benefited greatly from comments by Tom Berg and the 
other participants at a faculty colloquia at the University of St. Thomas. 
 1.  Paul Moses, Which Side Are They On?, COMMONWEAL, May 20, 2011, at 18 (quoting 
Joseph Fahey’s testimony for the New York State United Teachers Union in the Manhattan College 
Case). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When should laws of general application apply to religiously affiliated 
entities?  Although there is little question that churches themselves are 
exempt from most precepts of the law, more difficult questions arise with 
respect to whether other religious institutions should benefit from an 
exemption.  Many of those questions have arisen with respect to the 
application of laws addressing the employer-employee relationship. 
In some cases resolving the question requires an analysis of the 
character of the institution itself.  This is the approach, for example, taken by 
some states with respect to statutes requiring prescription contraception 
coverage—the statute applies unless an entity is a “religious employer” (or 
some similar term) within the meaning of the statute. 
In other cases, the determination is whether a particular employee or 
group of employees is exempt from the protection of certain laws that would 
otherwise apply to a religious institution.  That is the case with the 
ministerial exemption of Title VII,2 which exempts from its protections 
ministerial employees of a religious employer.3 
My focus in this Article is on how the National Labor Relations Board 
(the NLRB or the Board) determines whether to exercise jurisdiction over 
religious colleges and universities, subjecting them to the collective 
bargaining requirements of the National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA).4  
The NLRB’s current approach is to examine whether the educational 
institution has a “substantial religious character,”5 in the absence of which it 
will exercise jurisdiction.  As evidenced by two recent decisions by NLRB 
regional directors in cases involving efforts by adjunct faculty to form 
unions—one involving Saint Xavier College and one involving Manhattan 
College6 and both of which are currently on appeal to the full Board7—the 
 2.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 3.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  
 4.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–160 (2006). 
 5.  NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 503 (1979) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971)). 
 6.  Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33 (N.L.R.B. 
May 26, 2011); Manhattan Coll., No. 2-RC-23543, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94 (N.L.R.B. 
Jan. 10, 2011). 
 7.  Manhattan College’s Employer’s Request for Review of the Regional Director’s Decision 
and Direction of Election was filed with the NLRB on Jan. 24, 2011.  Empl’r’s Request for Review 
of a Decision of the Reg’l Dir., Manhattan Coll., No. 2-RC-24543, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. 
LEXIS 94 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 10, 2011) (filed on Jan. 24, 2011).  The Board issued an order on Feb. 16, 
2011 granting review, but denying the request to delay proceeding with the election until the process 
of review is completed.  Order Granting Emp’r’s Request for Review of the Acting Reg’l Dir.’s 
Decision and Direction of Election,  No. 2-RC-24543, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 45 (N.R.L.B. Feb. 16, 
2011).  Saint Xavier University’s Employer’s Request for Review of the Regional Director’s 
Decision and Direction of Election was filed with the NLRB on June 9, 2011.  Saint Xavier Univ.’s 
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substantial religious character test is an unnecessarily intrusive one that 
substitutes the government’s views about what it means to be religious for 
the views of the institution and the religious community with which it is 
affiliated.  
The intrusiveness of the substantial religious character test led the D.C. 
Circuit to establish an alternate test for determining whether religious 
colleges and universities should be exempt from the requirements of the 
Emp’r’s Request for Review of the Reg’l Dir.’s Decision and Direction of Election, Saint Xavier 
Univ. Emp’r, No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33 (N.R.L.B. May 26, 2011) 
(filed on June 9, 2011).  The Board issued an order on July 13, 2011 granting the request.  Order 
Granting Emp’r’s Request for Review of the Reg’l Dir.’s Decision and Direction of Election, Saint 
Xavier Univ. Emp’r, No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 350 (N.R.L.B. July 13, 2011).  Several 
amicus briefs have been filed in both cases.  For amicus briefs filed for Manhattan College, see, e.g., 
Amicus Brief of Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists & the Ass’n of Christian Sch. Int’l in 
Support of Emp’r on Review of a Decision of the Reg’l Dir., Manhattan Coll., No. 2-RC-23543, 
2011 NLRB LEXIS 45 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 16, 2011) (filed on Apr. 20, 2011); Brief for Amici Curiae 
Ass’n of Catholic Colls. & Univs. et al. in Support of Emp’r, id. (No. 2-RC-23543) [hereinafter 
Catholic Colleges Amicus Brief] (filed on Apr. 25, 2011); Brief of the Am. Fed’n Labor & Cong. of 
Indus. Org. & the Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFL-CIO, id. (No. 2-RC-23543) [hereinafter AFL-CIO 
Amicus Brief] (filed on Sept. 23, 2011).  For amicus briefs filed for Saint Xavier, see, e.g., Amicus 
Brief of Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, et al. in Support of Emp’r on Review of a 
Decision of the Reg’l Dir., Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 350 
(N.L.R.B. July 13, 2011) (filed on Aug. 4, 2011); Brief for Amici Curiae Ass’n of Catholic Colls. & 
Univs. et al. in Support of Emp’r, id. (No. 13-RC-22025) (filed on Aug. 29, 2011); Amicus Brief of 
the AFL-CIO & the Am. Fed’n of Teachers, id. (No. 13-RC-22025) (filed on Sept. 14, 2011).  All of 
the aforementioned orders, amicus briefs, and other filings mentioned in this footnote are available 
online.  For materials related to Saint Xavier University, see Case 13-RC-022025, NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, http://nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-022025 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).  For materials 
related to Manhattan College, see Case 02-RC-023543, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
http://nlrb.gov/case/02-RC-023543 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
  How soon the Board will issue a decision on the appeals is unclear.  The NLRB must have at 
least three members to take any actions, including issuing decisions.  See New Process Steel v. 
NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).  The combination of the departure of NLRB Chair Wilma Liebman 
on August 28, 2011, and the expiration of Craig Becker’s term at the end of 2011, left the Board 
with only two members.  On January 4, 2012, President Obama made recess appointments to fill the 
three vacancies.  See White House Office of the Press Secretary: President Obama Announces 
Recess Appointments to Key Administration Posts, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/04/president-obama-announces-recess-
appointments-key-administration-posts.  That action is being challenged, although the Department of 
Justice has already expressed the view that the President’s action was lawful.  See Memorandum 
Opinion from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel & Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant 
Attorney, for the Counsel to the President on Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess 
of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf.  The NLRB has already issued a 
decision explicitly rejecting the claim that it lacked a quorum, relying on the presumption of 
regularity of official acts of public officials.  Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Mar. 
29, 2012). 
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NLRA.  This test, established in University of Great Falls v. NLRB,8 has the 
virtue of being simple and nonintrusive, asking only whether an institution 
holds itself out to the public as a religious institution, is non-profit, and is 
religiously affiliated.9  As a practical matter, the Great Falls test says that 
religiously-affiliated institutions of higher education are always exempt from 
the NLRA’s collective bargaining requirements. 
The clash between the NLRB’s substantial religious character test and 
the Great Falls test arises from the only Supreme Court decision addressing 
the question of NLRB jurisdiction over religious schools: the Court’s 1979 
decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,10 which held that Congress 
did not intend “to bring teachers in church-operated schools within the 
jurisdiction of the Board.”11  As a result of the Court’s construction of the 
NLRA, which the dissent termed “plainly wrong in light of the Act’s 
language, its legislative history, and this Court’s precedent,”12 the sole focus 
of inquiry has been on whether an institution is a “church-operated school.”13 
The dispute over the respective merits and faults of the current NLRB 
and the Great Falls approaches fails to address in a direct way the central 
question of whether the assertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB over religious 
colleges and universities, and the resulting duty on the part of such 
institutions to collectively bargain with their employees pursuant to the 
dictates of the NLRA, would present a substantial risk of excessive 
government entanglement with religion.14  Because Catholic Bishop dealt 
with the question of NLRB jurisdiction in the context of parochial high 
schools, it did not directly address this question and, for reasons I will argue, 
Catholic Bishop should not be read to preclude, in all cases, the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the NLRB over religious colleges and universities. 
Directly examining whether and under what circumstances a risk of 
entanglement is present to determine whether the NLRB should exercise 
jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities has two advantages over 
 8.  278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 9.  Id. at 1347. 
 10.  440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 11.  Id. at 507. 
 12.  Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  For Justice Brennan, the fact that none of the Act’s eight 
express exceptions covered church-operated schools was dispositive.  Id. at 512. 
 13.  Id. at 507 (majority opinion). 
 14.  As my framing of the question suggests, I reject a broad theory of church autonomy such as 
that argued by Professor Laycock, who would grant religious organizations much broader 
exemptions from protective labor and employment laws than I believe is justified.  See, e.g., Douglas 
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of The Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations 
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).  More persuasive is the view 
that “the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, 
at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant’s freedom to exercise religious 
rights.”  Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985). 
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focusing on the institution’s character.  First, it does not require the NLRB 
or the courts to determine whether an institution is sufficiently religious and, 
indeed, what it means for an institution to be religious, thus avoiding the 
pitfalls of the current NLRB test.  Second, it allows a more focused analysis 
than does Great Falls, thus better promoting the interests of federal labor 
laws in favor of collective bargaining while avoiding undue interference 
with the protected activity of religious colleges and universities.  The strong 
federal policy in favor of collective bargaining argues for depriving the 
NLRB of jurisdiction only where application of the NLRA and resulting 
oversight by the NLRB would create a First Amendment violation. 
Section II of this Article gives a brief history of the NLRB’s approach to 
the exercise of jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities.  Section 
III addresses the weakness of the NLRB’s substantial religious character 
test.  Section IV addresses the central question of whether and under what 
circumstances the exercise of jurisdiction by NLRB over religious colleges 
and universities would create a risk of substantial entanglement.  Finally, 
drawing from the conclusions of Section IV, Section V lays out some 
considerations to guide the NLRB in determining when it should exercise 
jurisdiction when employees of religious colleges and universities seek to 
unionize.  Because both the Supreme Court guidance on this issue and the 
recent NLRB decisions have involved Catholic colleges and universities, 
they are the primary focus of this analysis.  The analysis and conclusions, 
however, are intended to guide the NLRB’s approach to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over other religious colleges and universities as well. 
II.  THE ROAD TO THE CURRENT NLRB TEST 
A.  The Requirements of the NLRA 
Congress’s intent in passing the NLRA was to “encourag[e] the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining” and to protect “the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions of their employment.”15  To accomplish that aim, the 
statute gives employees the right to organize, form, or join a labor 
organization to bargain collectively, and to participate in concerted activity 
for the purpose of collective bargaining.16 
 15.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 16.  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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Once a union is certified to collectively bargain on behalf of employees, 
employers are required to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with 
representatives of the union with respect to issues of “wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.”17  Failure to do so is an unfair 
labor practice under the NLRA, which also identifies a number of other 
unfair labor practices, including interference with the rights of workers to 
bargain collectively or engage in concerted activity as to the terms and 
conditions of employment.18 
The NLRA gives employees and their representatives the ability to file 
an unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB, which the agency then 
investigates.19  If the Regional Director finds merit in the charge, it will file a 
formal complaint against the employer, often first referring the case to 
arbitration.20  If the case it not settled, it goes before an Administrative Law 
Judge of the NLRB whose decision can be appealed.21 
B.  The NLRB’s Position Before and After Catholic Bishop 
The NLRA gives broad jurisdiction to the NLRB, although it does 
specify several categories of exclusion from the definitions of “employer” 
and “employee” for purposes of the statute.22  There is no express exemption 
from the statute covering educational or other charitable institutions or their 
employees.23  It, thus, would not be outlandish to assert, as Justice Brennan 
did in his dissenting opinion in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,24 that 
Congress intended to subject all employers and employees, other than those 
specifically excepted by the statute, to the NLRA and, hence, the jurisdiction 
of the NLRB.25 
 17.  29 U.S.C. § 158(d).  These are “mandatory” subjects of collective bargaining.  Id.  With 
respect to other subjects (“permissive” subjects of collective bargaining), parties are “free to bargain 
or not to bargain.”  NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
 18.  29 U.S.C. § 158. 
 19.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), 160(b), 161; 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (2011); The NLRB Process, 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb-process (last visited Apr. 11, 
2012). 
 20.  29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (2011); 29 USC § 160(c).  See Investigate Charges, NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (“When the NLRB 
investigation finds sufficient evidence to support the charge, every effort is made to facilitate a 
settlement between the parties.  In recent years, the Agency’s settlement rate has been above 85 
percent of meritorious cases.”) (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); Facilitate Settlements, NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/facilitate-settlements (last visited Apr. 11, 
2012). 
 21.  29 U.S.C. § 160(f); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.34, 102.45 (2011). 
 22.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 25.  The dissent in Catholic Bishop also believed that legislative (including subsequent) history 
of the NLRA also supported its argument.  Id. at 511–17.  For an argument that “the legislative 
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It took some time for this question to arise.  Acting on its own 
discretion, the NLRB for many years declined to exercise jurisdiction over 
all nonprofit educational institutions, secular as well as religious.26  
However, in 1970, it changed its policy, holding that nonprofit educational 
institutions whose operations had a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
were within the scope of the NLRA.27  The Board justified its altered policy 
on the change in the level of engagement of educational institutions with 
commercial operations, the expanded federal governmental role in higher 
education, and the “expand[ed] congressional recognition that employees in 
the nonprofit sector are entitled to the same benefits which federal statutes 
provide to employees in the profitmaking sphere.”28 
With respect to religious schools, the NLRB initially declined to 
exercise jurisdiction only when a school was “completely religious, not just 
religiously associated.”29  Despite First Amendment challenges to its broad 
assertion of jurisdiction over religious schools, the NLRB was consistent in 
its view that “[r]egulation of labor relations does not violate the First 
Amendment when it involves a minimal intrusion on religious conduct and 
is necessary to obtain [the Act’s] objective.”30 
In Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,31 the Seventh Circuit firmly 
rejected the NLRB’s method of determining whether to exercise jurisdiction 
over religious schools.32  In the view of the court, the board’s “dichotomous 
‘completely religious—merely religiously associated’ standard provides no 
workable guide to the exercise of discretion.  The determination that an 
institution is so completely a religious entity as to exclude any viable secular 
history of the NLRA is more complex and more inconclusive than either the majority or the dissent 
in Catholic Bishop acknowledged” and thus “cannot be relied upon either to support or refute the 
existence of NLRB jurisdiction over religiously-affiliated schools,” see Debra L. Willen, NLRB 
Regulation of Religiously-Affiliated Schools: The Board’s Current Jurisdictional Test, 13 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 38, 50–51 (1991). 
 26.  The Board announced this policy in Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).  
Quoting the 1974 Conference Report to the statute, it said that the report indicates “approval of and 
reliance upon the Board’s asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations ‘only in exceptional 
circumstances and in connection with purely commercial activities of such organizations.’  Whether 
or not this language provides a mandate, it certainly provides a guide.”  Id. at 427 (quoting H.R. REP. 
No. 80-510, at 32 (1947)). 
 27.  Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).  Following its decision in Cornell University, the 
NLRB began to assert jurisdiction over non-profit, private secondary schools as well as universities. 
 28.  Id. at 332. 
 29.  Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Balt., 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 250 (1975). 
 30.  Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976). 
 31.  559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 32.  Id. at 1118. 
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components obviously implicates very sensitive questions of faith and 
tradition.”33  Recognizing that the effect of rejecting the “completely 
religious” test would mean that the NLRB would exercise jurisdiction over 
all church-operated schools, the court next considered whether the exercise 
of such jurisdiction was consistent with the First Amendment.34  Its answer 
to that question was no.35  The court believed that being forced to engage in 
collective bargaining would impose a chilling effect “on the exercise of the 
bishops’ control of the religious mission of the schools” and that, therefore, 
the First Amendment precluded the NLRB’s exercise of jurisdiction.36 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s opinion without 
addressing the constitutional question.37  In a 5–4 decision, it held that 
teachers in high schools operated by a church are not within the coverage of 
the NLRA because Congress did not clearly express an affirmative intention 
that teachers in church-operated schools fell within the coverage of the Act.38  
Because it believed that the exercise of jurisdiction by the NLRB over 
religious high schools presents a significant risk that the First Amendment 
would be infringed, the Court concluded that “Congress did not contemplate 
that the Board would require church-operated schools to grant recognition to 
unions as bargaining agents for their teachers.”39  That construction of the 
statute allowed the Court to avoid resolving “difficult and sensitive 
questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses.”40 
The NLRB initially took the position that Catholic Bishop applied only 
to religious elementary and secondary schools (parochial schools) and did 
not require it to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over religious colleges 
and universities.41  Over time, it developed a new policy.  Concluding that 
the reasoning of Catholic Bishop applied to colleges and universities that 
shared characteristics with the schools at issue in that case, the NLRB 
determined that it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over religious 
colleges and universities that had a “substantial religious character.”42  The 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1131. 
 36.  Id. at 1124. 
 37.  Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 506. 
 40.  Id. at 507 (emphasis added).  The Court observed that “in the absence of a clear expression 
of Congress’ intent to bring teachers in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, 
we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult 
and sensitive” First Amendment questions.  Id. 
 41.  See Coll. of Notre Dame, 245 N.L.R.B. 386 (1979).  The NLRB took the same position in 
Lewis University, 265 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1982). 
 42.  Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 503 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 616 (1971)). 
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Board determined that, henceforth, it would evaluate on a case-by-case basis 
whether or not to exercise jurisdiction based on a consideration of “all 
aspects of a religious school’s organization and function that may be 
relevant to the ‘inquiry whether the exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction 
presents a significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.’”43 
The NRLB’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction over a religious 
school based on its application of its “substantial religious character” test 
does not mean teachers at that school are completely barred from 
unionization, but it does mean that they may not avail themselves of the 
protection afforded by federal labor law.44  They can only request a school’s 
administration to recognize their union and engage in collective bargaining 
with the union, with no recourse if the employer refuses.45  Thus, in 2004 
when the Archdiocese of Boston determined to cease bargaining with the 
union that had been representing teachers at eight regional Catholic high 
schools at the expiration of the teachers’ prior contract, the teachers lost all 
rights of the prior contract regarding class load, preparation time, job 
security, health insurance, and other conditions.46  In 2008 the diocese of 
Scranton decided it would no longer bargain with the union that had been 
representing teachers in that diocese, and in 2009, the Archdiocese of New 
York did the same.47  In each case, teachers had no legal recourse.48  
III.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT NLRB APPROACH 
The question of when laws of general application apply to religiously 
affiliated institutions arises in a number of different contexts.  Entities 
 43.  The Faculty Ass’n of St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 N.L.R.B. 65, 68 (1986).  In coming to its 
conclusion, the Board observed that some colleges “exhibit[] many characteristics of a school which 
is truly church-operated within the meaning of Catholic Bishop.”  Id.  Considering the school in 
question, the Board determined that assertion of jurisdiction would be inappropriate because of the 
“College’s requirement that faculty members conform to Catholic doctrine and agree on hire ‘to 
promote the objectives and goals . . . of the Sisters of Mercy of Maine.’”  Id. (quoting a letter that all 
new faculty of St. Joseph must sign); see also Livingstone Coll., 286 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1987) 
(determining that the exercise of jurisdiction by the NLRB would not create a significant risk of 
entanglement). 
 44.  See Charles S. Chesnavage, Catholic Social Justice Teaching and Catholic School Teacher’s 
Unions: Failing to Practice What You Preach, in Interfaith Theological Symposium on Economic 
Justice 36, 37 (2011), available at http://www.catholiclabor.org/gen-art/Theological%20 
Symposium%202011.pdf. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 7–8. 
 48.  Id. 
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meeting the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of a religious organization 
are exempt from taxation.49  State statutes requiring that prescription plans 
cover prescription contraceptives often exclude “religious employers,” 
requiring a determination of whether the state definition of a religious 
employer has been met.50  The Civil Rights Act exempts religious 
organizations from prohibitions on discrimination on the grounds of 
religion.51 
In the context of the NLRA, the NLRB’s test for determining whether to 
exercise jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities is a cure worse 
than the disease.  The Board’s “substantial religious character” test involves 
an improper inquiry into matters of religion and belief, and essentially 
allows the agency to substitute its view of what it means to be a religious 
school and provide a religious education for that of the religious institution.52 
In determining whether a religious school has a substantial religious 
character, the Board “has not relied solely on the employer’s affiliation with 
a religious organization, but rather has evaluated the purpose of the 
employer’s operations, the role of the unit employees in effectuating that 
purpose, and the potential effects if the Board exercised jurisdiction.”53  In 
making its evaluation, the NLRB also considers factors such as the 
“involvement of the religious institution in the daily operation of the school” 
and the “degree to which the school has a religious mission and 
curriculum.”54 
As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Great Falls, the Board’s inquiry 
essentially boils down to whether the school is “sufficiently religious.”55  
Consider the recent decisions by NLRB regional directors in Saint Xavier 
University56 and Manhattan College.57  Both involved efforts by adjunct 
faculty to form unions and in both cases, the regional directors rejected the 
 49.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (explaining the requirements for tax-exempt status). 
 50.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2003).  The same is true of the 
Affordable Care Act. 
 51.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006) (noting that the Civil Rights Act does not apply to religious 
organizations). 
 52.  See, e.g., Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (summarizing 
and rejecting the NLRB’s “substantial religious character” test). 
 53.  Id. at 1664–65 (2000), vacated, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1343. 
 56.  Saint Xavier Univ. Emp’r, No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33 
(N.L.R.B. May 26, 2011). 
 57.  Manhattan Coll., No. 2-RC-23543, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 10, 
2011). 
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university’s claim that the Board lacked jurisdiction because it was a 
religiously operated institution, and ordered that a union election be held.58 
The decisions in both cases contain extensive discussion and analysis of 
the schools’ Catholic identity and history, mission and purpose, hiring 
practices and governance.59  In Manhattan College, the NLRB Regional 
Director determined that the fact that Manhattan College did not impose 
“Church affiliation and religious observance as a condition for hiring or 
admission, . . . set quotas based on religious affiliation, . . . require loyalty 
oaths, attendance at religious services, or courses in Catholic theology,” 
meant it lacked a substantial religious character.60  In Saint Xavier, among 
the factors considered important by the Regional Director was the fact that 
faculty are not required to indoctrinate students or imbue curriculum with 
Church doctrine or religion.61 
The current NLRB approach has “the NLRB trolling through the beliefs 
of the University, making determinations about its religious mission, and 
that mission’s centrality to the ‘primary purpose’ of the University.”62  
Underlying the NLRB approach are assumptions about what it means to be a 
religious entity and what it means to provide a religious university 
education, assumptions that “misunderst[an]d the nature of Catholic higher 
education in the United States . . . .”63  When one reads the NLRB decisions, 
it is clear that for the agency, a university is not religious if propagation of a 
religious faith is not its primary purpose, if students and faculty are not 
required to engage in worship, or if the school welcomes people of other 
faiths.   
The NLRB’s current approach is particularly problematic when applied 
to Catholic colleges and universities. 
[T]he organizational independence and broad educational mission 
of many CCUs does not mean those institutions are not “Catholic” 
or “religious.”  Inter-faith dialogue is an essential aspect[] of the 
Catholic Church’s mission to engage the world.  Church institutions 
do not lose their religious identity by carrying out that mission; to 
 58.  See Saint Xavier Univ., 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33, at *1–3; Manhattan Coll., 
2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94, at *1, 40–42. 
 59.  See Saint Xavier Univ. Emp’r, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33, at *3–16; Manhattan 
Coll., 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94, at *3–25. 
 60.  Manhattan Coll., 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94, at *20. 
 61.  Saint Xavier Univ., 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33, at *13–14. 
 62.  Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 63.  Catholic Colleges Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 3. 
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the contrary, they fulfill one of their core religious functions by 
serving as “a primary and privileged place for a fruitful dialogue 
between the Gospel and culture.”64 
To put the best light on the NLRB’s approach, its test is clearly intended 
to address the concerns of Catholic Bishop that the exercise of jurisdiction 
could risk entanglement.65  Focusing on the character of the institution as a 
proxy for focusing directly on the issue of entanglement, however, requires 
the Board to make judgments about what it means for an institution to 
possess a religious character.66  The NLRB’s application of its current test 
involves an exercise not very different from the process criticized in 
Catholic Bishop. 
Based on these concerns, the D.C. Circuit adopted a different approach 
in Great Falls.   Under its bright-line test, a university is exempt from NLRB 
jurisdiction if it (a) holds itself out to students, faculty, and the community 
as providing a religious educational environment; (b) is organized as a non-
profit entity; and (c) is in some way affiliated with or owned by a recognized 
religious organization.67 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT NLRB APPROACH 
A.  What Does Catholic Bishop Allow? 
In the context of lay teachers at Catholic high schools, the Supreme 
Court held in Catholic Bishop that there would be a significant risk of 
infringement of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment if the NLRA 
conferred jurisdiction over church-operated schools.68  The first question is 
the extent to which Catholic Bishop should be read to apply to religious 
colleges and universities.  There are two possible readings of the Supreme 
 64.  Id. at 14 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶ 43 
(1990)). 
 65.  See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) (noting the danger of “an 
impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement in the affairs of the church-operated 
schools”). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The D.C. Circuit 
reiterated its test in Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2009), holding that the 
college was exempt from NLRB jurisdiction.  Because federal agencies generally follow a policy of 
intracircuit nonacquiescence, Great Falls is not binding on the agency outside of the D.C. Circuit.  
See Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957) (stating the Board’s “consistent policy 
for itself to determine whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a circuit court of appeals”).  The 
Great Falls reasoning, however, has been applied in other contexts.  See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. 
v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that criteria for state scholarships 
involved unconstitutionally intrusive scrutiny of an institution’s religious belief and practice). 
 68.  Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501–03 (1979). 
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Court’s decision, and which reading one adopts affects how one thinks about 
this question. 
One possible reading is that, by its terms, Catholic Bishop applies to all 
educational institutions, meaning that all church-operated educational 
institutions at every level are exempt from the jurisdiction of the NLRB.69  If 
that is the correct reading of Catholic Bishop, the only question that can be 
asked is what it means for an organization to be “church-operated.”  This 
appears to be how the D.C. Circuit court reads the decision, based on its 
holding in Great Falls.70  It is also how then-Judge Breyer read Catholic 
Bishop in his decision in Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB.71 
The alternative reading is that Catholic Bishop held only that parochial 
grade and high schools are exempt from NLRB jurisdiction and, by its 
terms, does not preclude NLRB jurisdiction over colleges and universities in 
all circumstances.  If that is the case, one might conclude that the current 
NLRB test for exercising jurisdiction is unduly intrusive, but still support the 
NLRB’s approach of considering on a case-by-case basis whether to 
exercise jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities, based on the 
guidance provided by Catholic Bishop. 
In considering which of the two readings is superior, it is relevant that 
there is an enormous difference between parochial grade and high schools 
and Catholic colleges and universities.  As the Supreme Court observed in 
Tilton v. Richardson: 
There are generally significant differences between the religious 
aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning and 
parochial elementary and secondary schools. . . . Since religious 
indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these 
church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than 
 69.  This is the conclusion articulated in Saint Xavier University’s response brief.  See Saint 
Xavier Univ. Response to Petitioner’s Brief & to the AFL-CIO’s & the Am. Fed’n of Teachers’ 
Amici Curiae Brief in Support of the Reg’l Dir.’s Decision at 2 n.1, Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-
22025, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33 (N.L.R.B. May 26, 2011), available at 
mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806e75e5 (filed on Oct. 28, 2011) (arguing that 
Catholic Bishop means that “church-operated schools, as a whole, are exempt from jurisdiction 
under the Act and that the Board may not perform further inquiry beyond the three-prong approach 
set forth in Carroll College and Great Falls”). 
 70.  Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1341. 
 71.  Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 398–99 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the 
area of secular education.72 
The Court’s language in Catholic Bishop reflects that difference.  
Although Catholic Bishop uses the phrase “church-operated” school rather 
than parochial school,73 the language the Court uses to talk about the risk of 
entanglement is descriptive of parochial schools but not typically of colleges 
and universities that are not seminary schools.  The “entire focus of Catholic 
Bishop was upon the obligation of lay faculty to imbue and indoctrinate the 
student body with the tenets of a religious faith,”74 which is not present at the 
university level.75  As the dissenting opinion in Bayamon recognized, the 
“basic rationale” of Catholic Bishop rested “on the unique role that teachers 
in elementary and secondary schools play as servants of the Church in 
fulfilling the religious mission of the school,” a role that is very different 
from the role of university professors.76  The dissent observed: 
Because the Court saw teachers in parochial schools as essentially 
servants of the Church in carrying out the religious missions of 
elementary and secondary schools, the Court could hold that the 
very existence of a union and mandatory bargaining in such schools 
would impermissibly violate this essential relationship between 
church and teacher.  Teachers in the lower grades play such an 
integral role in inculcating their students with the school’s religious 
doctrine, and play such an important role as religious models for 
their students, that the Supreme Court could well conclude that any 
state labor regulation would inevitably result in the entanglement of 
religion and government.77 
In addition, Catholic Bishop’s holding addressed only the question of the 
Board’s jurisdiction over teachers at parochial schools.  The Court’s holding 
“does not ‘exclude church-operated schools, as entire units, from the 
coverage of the NLRA.’”78 
 72.  Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685, 687 (1971). 
 73.  This was a point of significance for then-Judge Breyer in Bayamon.  See Bayamon, 793 F.2d 
at 392, 399–406 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 74.  NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High Sch., 623 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 75.  For example, in Manhattan College, even the college’s required course in Catholic Studies 
“is a process to study Catholic ethics or rituals or teaching, but not to make people Catholic.  It is not 
designed to indoctrinate in any way.”  Moses, supra note 1, at 19.  It is notable that Catholic Bishop 
was decided during the Lemon/Tilton era, during which the Court was concerned with making the 
distinction between pervasively sectarian schools and other religiously-affiliated schools. 
 76.  Bayamon, 793 F.2d at 403–04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Id. at 404. 
 78.  AFL-CIO Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 
1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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Thus, the better view is that Catholic Bishop is not binding on the 
application of the NLRA to religious colleges and universities.  Rather, the 
NLRB’s determination to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to exercise 
jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities, is an effort to apply the 
spirit of Catholic Bishop so as to avoid excessive entanglement.  The 
relevant question thus becomes whether the exercise by the NLRB of 
regulatory oversight over the collective bargaining process presents a 
significant risk of infringement of religious freedom. 
I frame the question in terms of NLRB regulatory oversight because 
collective bargaining itself presents no problem for Catholic institutions.  
Catholic social thought strongly favors the rights of workers to engage in 
collective bargaining, calling labor unions a “positive influence for social 
order and solidarity” and “therefore an indispensible element of social life.”79  
Thus, the disagreement of those who oppose the NLRB’s jurisdiction over 
Catholic colleges and universities is not with the effort by faculty to seek a 
representative to bargain collectively on their behalf.80  Rather, it is 
opposition either to the NLRB’s effort to determine whether an institution is 
religious or with its exercise of oversight of the bargaining process.  The 
following two sections explore two potential risks to NLRB oversight. 
B.  Concerns about First Amendment Implications of NLRB Oversight 
In Catholic Bishop, the Supreme Court expressed the concern that 
NLRB oversight of the collective bargaining process in parochial schools 
could “implicate sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts between 
clergy-administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators for 
unions.”81  It also feared that resolution by the NLRB of unfair labor practice 
charges against such schools could require it to inquire “into the good faith 
 79.  PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF 
THE CHURCH, ¶ 305 (2004).  For a fuller discussion of Catholic social thought and unions, see Ken 
Matheny, Catholic Social Teaching on Labor and Capital: Some Implications for Labor Law, 24 ST. 
JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 1 (2009). 
 80.  Indeed, the full-time faculty of Saint Xavier University are represented by a union.  Saint 
Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33, at *15 n.13 (N.L.R.B. May 
26, 2011).  In contrast to an issue much in the news in recent times, the issue here is very different 
from the claim that mandating that Catholic institutions provide contraceptive coverage to their 
employees violates religious freedom, a mandate that would force such institutions to participate in 
something as to which they have deep religiously-based opposition. 
 81.  NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 503 (1979). 
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of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to 
the school’s religious mission.”82 
Even as to parochial schools, there is no unanimity on whether 
subjecting religious educational institutions to laws regulating collective 
bargaining creates a constitutional problem.  The view of the Seventh Circuit 
in Catholic Bishop that it does create a constitutional problem has been 
rejected by several courts that have addressed the application of state 
collective bargaining laws to religious educational institutions.83 
In evaluating the risks of NLRB oversight of the collective bargaining 
process in Catholic colleges and universities, the first thing to consider is 
that Catholic colleges and universities already voluntarily subject themselves 
to secular oversight and regulation of a number of matters having to do with 
terms and conditions of employment by virtue of seeking accreditation from 
a regional accrediting agency. 
Accreditation by a recognized accrediting organization is required in 
order for an institution to receive federal funds such as student aid and other 
federal programs.84  In addition, some states have accreditation requirements 
for institutions operating in their states.85  Apart from legal requirements, 
accreditation is thought desirable from a marketing standpoint because it 
gives some assurance of quality of the institution. 
Although there are a number of faith-related accreditors, virtually all 
Catholic colleges and universities seek and obtain accreditation by regional 
accreditors.86  Among the 231 institutions that seek accreditation only by a 
 82.  Id. at 502. 
 83.  See, e.g., Christ the King Reg’l High Sch. v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987); In re 
Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992); In re N.Y. 
State Emp’t Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997).  But see 
Mich. Educ. Ass’n v. Christian Bros. Inst. of Mich., 706 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) 
(because religion permeated the educational experience at Brother Rice, there would be substantial 
First Amendment concerns involved if the Michigan Education Association could unionize 
teachers). 
 84.  Michael W. Prairie & Lori A. Chamberlain, Due Process in the Accreditation Context, 21 
J.C. & U.L. 61, 62 (1994). 
 85.  For example, Virginia requires all private colleges and universities to be accredited.  PETER 
EWELL, MARIANNE BOEKE & STACEY ZIS, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION, 
STATE USES OF ACCREDITATION: RESULTS OF A FIFTY-STATE INVENTORY 67 app., available at 
http://www.chea.org/pdf/State_Uses_of_Accreditation.pdf. 
 86.  Three-hundred sixty-nine religiously-affiliated universities are accredited by faith-based 
agencies.  Of those, one-hundred thirty-eight are also accredited by regional accrediting agencies.  
The Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and Programs, DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/Search.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).  The database was searched 
by accrediting agency and included only the faith-based or religious accrediting agencies to 
determine the number of schools accredited by only faith-based accrediting agencies. 
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religious agency,87 eschewing oversight by regional accreditors, only four 
are Catholic institutions, and those four are seminary schools accredited by 
the Association of Theological Schools.88  Thus, almost all Catholic 
institutions choose to seek regional accreditation, either in addition to or in 
lieu of accreditation by religious agencies. 
This means that Catholic colleges and universities already voluntarily 
subject themselves to the oversight of regional agencies regarding terms and 
conditions of the employment of their faculty and of faculty/university 
relations.  That they do so suggests that being subject to NLRB oversight 
would not impose a unique burden on their institutions.  Accreditors already 
impose requirements on them as to faculty governance, academic freedom 
and other matters that relate to terms and conditions of employment. 
Although there are special provisions in the accreditation standards for 
religious institutions and accrediting agencies tend to honor a school’s stated 
religious mission, there have been cases of conflict resulting from the 
accrediting agencies’ oversight of religious institutions.  In 2011, Patrick 
Henry College was denied accreditation because it required six-day 
creationism to be taught in biology class, causing the American Academy 
for Liberal Education (the AALE) to determine that the biology course did 
not satisfy the AALE’s basic knowledge requirement.89  The president of the 
AALE made clear that it had no objection to the teaching of creationism in 
theology classes—and has accredited colleges that do so—but that such 
teaching was inappropriate for a biology course.90  Also in 2011, La Sierra 
University, a Seventh-day Adventist institution, was put on warning by its 
regional accreditor that its church had too much influence on the school’s 
academic standards.91  The university’s response to a lawsuit filed by several 
terminated administrators and faculty suggests that the position of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church is that “Church leaders should be making 
 87.  The 231 is largely composed of Rabbinical schools, Baptist schools and miscellaneous Bible 
and Christian schools.  The Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutes and Programs, supra 
note 86. 
 88.  The four are Byzantine Catholic Seminary of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Saint Bernard’s 
School of Theology and Ministry, Saint Vincent Seminary, and University of Saint Mary of the Lake 
Mundelein Seminary.  Id.  See also Colleges & Universities, ASS’N OF CATHOLIC COLLS. & UNIVS., 
http://www.accunet.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3489 (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 89.  LaTonya Taylor, Christian College Denied Accreditation, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (July 8, 
2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/july8/15.16.html?start=1. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  La Sierra U. Is Warned by Accreditor over Church Influence, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. (Aug. 4, 2011, 1:21 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/la-sierra-u-warned-by-accreditor-
over-church-influence/35107. 
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academic and curriculum decisions,”92 a position that is likely to jeopardize 
its accreditation.  At the law school level, some have charged that “the ABA 
and AALS improperly single out religiously affiliated law schools for 
special scrutiny and curtail the ability of these law schools to provide legal 
education in a manner that is faithful to their mission.”93 
The question, then, is whether NLRB oversight over the collective 
bargaining process would add any additional intrusion that Catholic colleges 
and universities do not already voluntarily subject themselves to by virtue of 
accreditation requirements.  Focusing on the religious character of the 
institution does not even consider that question.   
There are several reasons to think subjecting religious colleges and 
universities to the jurisdiction of the NLRB would not involve additional 
intrusion of the type that would create a constitutional concern. 
First, the imposition of NLRA collective bargaining requirements is not 
likely to create entanglement with the religious mission of the school.  It is 
true that the NLRB can order collective bargaining over “wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment”94 (“mandatory subjects” of 
collective bargaining), and that the term “conditions of employment”95 is 
capable of a broad reading that theoretically could encompass academic 
policy.96  However, even in the secular context, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that “employers cannot be required to bargain over all decisions that 
directly affect the employment relationship,”97 and decisions involving the 
application of state labor laws to religious schools (generally high schools, 
where one would expect more likelihood of conflict than in a university) 
suggest that courts have managed to exclude religious matters from the 
scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining.98  More importantly, even with 
 92.  Press Release, McCune Wright LLP, Terminated La Sierra University Employees’ Counsel 
Responds to Defendants’ Initial Court Filings (Sept. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.mccunewright.com/assets/news/LSU_Press_Release_9-14-11.pdf. 
 93.  Steven M. Barkan, Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: The First Conference 
of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An Overview, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 249 (1995). 
 94.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 95.  Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining Under 
Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L. REV. 77, 92 (2004). 
 96.  In Catholic Bishop, the Court quoted Springfield Education Ass’n v. Springfield School 
District No. 19, 547 P.2d 647, 650 (Or. Ct. App. 1976), observing that “nearly everything that goes 
on in the schools affects teachers and is therefore arguably a ‘condition of employment.’”  NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490,  503 (1979). 
 97.  Brady, supra note 95, at 92 (discussing the application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), to the question of NLRB oversight 
over religious colleges and universities). 
 98.  See id. at 91; South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997) (holding that lay elementary school teachers had 
a state constitutional right to unionize and bargain collectively and limiting the scope of that right to 
secular terms and conditions of employment). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:50 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1317, 2013] Blame It on Catholic Bishop 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1335 
respect to mandatory subjects, the Board can require only that parties 
negotiate in good faith; it cannot “compel either party to agree to a proposal 
or require the making of a concession.”99  As one commentator observed, “It 
is difficult to understand how any NLRB bargaining order would interfere 
with the church’s right to autonomy . . . when the schools retain ultimate 
authority to decide whether to agree to any particular bargaining proposal or 
to make any concessions.”100 
Second, the dispute concerning NLRB jurisdiction over religious 
colleges and universities has generally involved adjunct faculty,101 with 
respect to whom there is less likely to be an entanglement issue.  Saint 
Xavier College is instructive.  Neither the offer nor the contract of adjunct 
faculty, nor the student evaluations which formed the primary basis of 
evaluating the adjuncts, made any mention of “the Sisters of Mercy, 
Catholicism, God, or religion.”102  Indeed, nothing related to religion ever 
formed any part of the evaluation of the adjuncts; the Regional Director 
found that “[a]djunct faculty cannot be dismissed for conduct contrary to the 
Church, nor can they be dismissed by the Sisters of Mercy or Church 
officials.”103 
Similarly, in Manhattan College, the Regional Director found that the 
role of adjunct faculty in effectuating the secular purpose of the college 
“does not involve propagating religious faith in any way.”104  Adjunct faculty 
were hired based on academic qualifications to fulfill academic 
obligations.105  As the Regional Director observed, “Because adjunct faculty 
are not required to advance a religious mission in any way, exercising 
jurisdiction over the College will not have any ‘potential effects’ leading to 
unconstitutional entanglement.”106  Given these facts, it is difficult to 
imagine how either the bargaining over the terms and conditions of adjunct 
employment—the traditional adjunct issues are better pay and benefits and 
job security—or the resolution of any unfair labor charge advanced by such 
faculty could involve wading into impermissible waters. 
 99.  29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 100.  Willen, supra note 25, at 73. 
 101.  Both Saint Xavier University, No. 13-RC-22025, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33, at 
*1 (N.L.R.B. May 26, 2011), and Manhattan College, Manhattan Coll., No. 2-RC-23543, 2011 
NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94, at *2–3 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 10, 2011), involve adjunct faculty. 
 102.  Saint Xavier Univ., 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 33, at *15. 
 103.  Id. at *16. 
 104.  Manhattan Coll., 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94, at *33. 
 105.  Id. at *25. 
 106.  Id. at *33. 
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Third, the Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop expressed concern about 
the inquiry that would be required where the NLRB was investigating an 
unfair labor practice charge.107  The Court feared that where a school’s 
defense to the charge was that their religious creed mandated their action in 
question, “the very process of inquiry” into the good faith of church 
administrators could lead to excessive entanglement.108  The Court’s concern 
is misplaced. 
Investigating unfair labor practices could require the Board to make a 
factual determination whether the complained of practice, for example, the 
discharge of a faculty member, was motivated by an illegal purpose, rather 
than a protected purpose.  But courts and agencies engage in such factual 
determinations of motive all of the time and doing so does not require 
adjudicating question of religious doctrine.  It is true that the Board might 
have to evaluate the sincerity of an asserted religious belief.  “This is no 
different, though, from the inquiry the courts regularly have made into the 
sincerity of asserted religious beliefs in First Amendment cases to insure that 
the free exercise claim is not fraudulent.”109 
It is clear that there are some situations where entanglement is more 
likely than others.  First, just as there is a difference between parochial 
elementary and high schools and religious colleges and universities, there is 
 107.  NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979). 
 108.  Id. at 502. 
 109.  Willen, supra note 25, at 71.  In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 621–22 (1986), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission over a claim that a Christian school terminated a 
teacher due to her pregnancy.  The school defended the termination on the ground that the reason for 
termination was the employee’s failure to follow the “Biblical chain of command” in seeking relief.  
Id. at 622–23.  In the view of the Court, “the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely 
investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson’s discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether 
the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.”  Id. at 628. 
  This issue was addressed in the context of the ministerial exemption to Title VII in EEOC v. 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. 
Ct. 694 (2012).  The Sixth Circuit rejected the fear that evaluating an employee’s claim under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act would require it to second guess a religious employer’s religious 
judgment; the employee’s claim 
would not require the court to analyze any church doctrine; rather a trial would focus on 
issues such as whether Perich was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, whether 
Perich opposed a practice that was unlawful under the ADA, and whether Hosanna-Tabor 
violated the ADA in its treatment of Perich. 
Id. at 781–82.  Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the existence of the ministerial 
exemption, the majority did not address this issue.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.  Justice 
Alito’s concurrence, however, rejected the Sixth Circuit view.  Id. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring). 
  Hosanna-Tabor presents a perhaps more difficult issue than the one with which I am 
concerned because, by definition, ministerial exemption claims involve employees with spiritual 
duties, making it more difficult to avoid theological or religious issues.  That difficulty was 
discussed in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the National Council of Churches of Christ.  Brief 
Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553).   
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a difference between an ordinary religiously-affiliated college and university 
and a seminary, the latter of which is designed to educate and prepare 
students for ordination to the priesthood or other ministerial position.  
Faculty in a seminary are much closer to parochial elementary and 
secondary schools in terms of their role in inculcating students with religious 
doctrine and serving as religious models for their students, meaning there is 
far greater potential for entanglement than in the case of other religious 
colleges and universities. 
Second, one can imagine greater possibility for entanglement in the case 
of full-time rather than adjunct faculty.  The question of NLRB jurisdiction 
over Catholic colleges has generally arisen with respect to adjunct faculty. 
This is perhaps explained by the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in NLRB v. 
Yeshiva University,110 which held that most private university tenure-track 
faculty are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the protection 
of the NLRA.111  While many have criticized the Court’s analysis and 
conclusion,112 it remains the law. 
Nonetheless, there have been instances where the NLRB has found that 
university professors lack the degree of autonomy necessary to exclude them 
from the protection of the NLRA.113  In situations where full-time faculty are 
 110.  444 U.S. 672 (1980).  In Yeshiva, the Court declined to address the question of the extension 
of Catholic Bishop to religious colleges and universities because it determined the faculty were not 
“employees” under the NLRA.  Id. at 679. 
 111.  Id. at 686.  In the view of the Court, faculty “exercise authority which in any other context 
unquestionably would be managerial.”  Id. 
 112.  See, e.g., Risa L. Lieberwitz, Faculty in the Corporate University: Professional Identity, 
Law and Collective Action, 16 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 266, 280–301 (2007) (critiquing 
Yeshiva “as a misreading of the NLRA and an inaccurate assessment of class relations between 
faculty and the university administration”). 
 113.  See, e.g., Carroll Coll., Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. No. 30, at 2 (July 20, 2007) (upholding 
determination that faculty were not managerial employees); Lewis Univ., 265 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1250 
(1982) (ruling that Lewis’ full-time professors were not managerial employees because they lacked 
final authority over significant University operations and were not involved in formulating and 
effectuating policies). 
  It is also entirely possible, given the nature of the governance of religious colleges and 
universities, that their faculty would be less likely than faculty of a secular university to be treated as 
management under Yeshiva, although in at least one instance that Board concluded that full-time 
faculty of a religious university were managerial and thus excluded.  See Duquesne Univ. of the 
Holy Ghost, 261 N.L.R.B. 587 (1982).  It has been argued that, as to Catholic colleges and 
universities, the Yeshiva distinction is a distortion of Catholic teaching.  David Gregory and Charles 
Russo write: 
From the integrated perspective of Catholic social teaching, workers cannot be artificially 
trifurcated into “supervisors” and “managers” and “employees” for the purposes of 
denigrating their core rights as workers qua workers to unionize and bargain collectively.  
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determined to be non-managerial employees, there is a greater likelihood of 
entanglement.114  I say “greater likelihood,” but even there, there is no 
guarantee of a constitutional problem.  Despite St. Xavier’s opposition to its 
adjunct faculty organizing, “the University’s full time faculty were 
organized under an NLRB election 20 years ago, and the University has 
continued to recognize and bargain with that union without experiencing any 
‘entanglement’ issues through to the current date.”115 
Finally, there is also arguably a greater potential for entanglement where 
graduate student assistants seek to unionize.  The NLRB’s position on the 
question of whether graduate student assistants are employees within the 
meaning of the NLRA is a moving target.  It traditionally held that teaching 
and research assistants are primarily students, not employees.116  However, 
in 2000, in a decision involving New York University, the NLRB overturned 
its prior precedent, holding that university graduate assistants are employees 
within the meaning of the NLRA and thus could form a collective 
bargaining unit.117  In 2004, it reversed itself yet again, holding in Brown 
University118 that graduate student assistants were not employees within the 
meaning of the NLRA in that the relationship between the university and the 
students was fundamentally educational, not economic.119  In a 2010 
From the perspective of Catholic labor theory, all who work are workers, without regard 
to secular labor law’s artificial class-based trifurcation of the world of work. 
David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Overcoming NLRB v. Yeshiva University by the 
Implementation of Catholic Labor Theory, 41 LAB. L.J. 55, 62 (1990). 
 114.  Where the employer is a church itself, the NLRB has determined it is inappropriate to 
examine the role that specific employees play in effectuating the employer’s religious purpose and 
will not exercise jurisdiction even over secular employees of religious institutions.  See, e.g., St. 
Edmund’s Roman Catholic Church, 337 N.L.R.B. 189 (2002).  However, where the employer is not 
the religious institution itself, nothing precludes the NLRB from engaging in such an inquiry. 
 115.  Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Reg’l Dir.’s Decision at 3, Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-
22025, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 350 (N.L.R.B. July 13, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/ 
link/document.aspx/09031d458065d347 (filed on Sept. 15, 2011). 
 116.  In several cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the Board held that graduate assistants could not be 
included in regular faculty bargaining units.  See, e.g., Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 214 N.L.R.B. 
621 (1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972). 
 117.  N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000), overruled by Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 
(2004).  The NLRB reasoned nothing precluded a determination that the assistants had dual status as 
students and employees; the fact that graduate students were not required to serve as assistants in 
order to obtain their degrees and that the university obtained substantial benefits from their serving 
in that capacity meant that their positions were not primarily educational.  Id. at 1220. 
 118.  342 N.L.R.B. 483. 
 119.  Id. at 483.  In the view of the NLRB, the interests of the university and the student, which 
primarily were aimed at the students’ educational advancement, could not be appropriately dealt 
with through the collective bargaining process.  Id. at 489–90.  For a discussion of the evolution of 
the Board’s view on this issue, see Ryan Patrick Dunn, Comment, Get a Real Job!  The National 
Labor Relations Board Decides Graduate Student Workers at Private Universities Are Not 
“Employees” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 851 (2006). 
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decision,120 the NLRB suggested there are “compelling reasons” to 
reconsider Brown University, and in June 2011, the Acting Director of the 
NLRB’s regional office in Manhattan said that graduate assistants have a 
“dual relationship” with the university that “does not necessarily preclude a 
finding of employee status.”121 
Although none of the cases involving efforts by graduate student 
assistants to organize have involved Catholic universities, such an effort 
could easily be forthcoming if the NLRB, in fact, overturns the Brown 
University decision.122  Should such a case arise, because of the dual role of 
employee and student, the possibility of entanglement appears greater than 
for adjunct professors. 
C.  Foreclosure of an Alternative Vision for Employer-Employee Relations 
In its amicus brief in Manhattan College, the Association of Catholic 
Colleges and Universities acknowledged that “[t]he Catholic Church has 
long supported the moral rights of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively,” and that “Catholic colleges and universities respect and 
support those teachings.”123  Nevertheless, it argued, such institutions “must 
have the freedom to pursue those goals without excessive government 
entanglement.”124 
The amicus’ concern was more fully articulated by Kathleen Brady.125   
Brady does not believe entanglement or interference with religious matters is 
threatened by application of labor laws to religious organizations, convinced 
that such problems “can be solved by limiting and adjusting applicable laws 
in religious contexts.”126  Her concern is with imposing the NLRA’s 
 120.  N.Y. Univ., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2010). 
 121.  Decision & Order Dismissing Petition at 26, New York Univ., No. 2-RC-23481, 356 
N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d4580509ccd (decision issued June 16, 2011). 
 122.  The question of whether graduate student assistants should be considered employees under 
the NLRA is beyond the scope of this Article.  For commentary on the question see, e.g., Sarah J. 
Bannister, Low Wages, Long Hours, Bad Working Conditions: Science and Engineering Graduate 
Students Should Be Considered Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 74 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 123 (2005); Robert A. Epstein, Breaking Down the Ivory Tower Sweatshops: Graduate 
Student Assistants and Their Elusive Search for Employee Status on the Private University Campus, 
20 ST. JOHN’S J. L. COMM. 157 (2005); Neal H. Hutchens & Melissa B. Hutchens, Catching the 
Union Bug: Graduate Student Employees and Unionization, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 105 (2003). 
 123.  Catholic Colleges Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 3. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Brady, supra note 95. 
 126.  Id. at 80. 
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statutory scheme on Catholic institutions.  Because the NLRA “presumes 
and perpetuates an adversarial relationship between workers and 
management, [whereas] Catholic teaching encourages relations that are more 
cooperative and collaborative,” requiring Catholic colleges to comply with 
the NLRA regime of collective bargaining would require Catholic 
institutions “to channel their employment relations into patterns of behavior 
that are deeply at odds with the Church’s basic vision for social life.”127 
For Brady, the ability of the Church to advance an alternative vision for 
social life—a vision built on love and mutual concern rather than on self-
interest—is crucial.  Religious organizations, in her view, offer a prophetic 
voice that “can push the larger community to reevaluate social and legal 
norms in light of new visions” that “can transform existing national values in 
progressive directions unimagined by prevailing orthodoxies.”128  In the area 
of labor relations, that means a more cooperative model of collective 
bargaining rather than the adversarial model of the NLRA.  She writes: 
When the Catholic Church teaches that labor relations, like other 
social relations, should be based upon mutual concern, cooperation 
and willingness to forgive and seek reconciliation, the Church 
challenges the assumptions and expectations underlying federal and 
state labor laws.  Rather than assuming distrust and conflicts of 
interest, the Church builds her approach to labor relations upon 
hope and the expectation that employers and employees can work 
together to see each others’ concerns and pursue the common good.  
Indeed, human fulfillment and social renewal require such self-
giving.  Thus, the Church rejects an essentially adversarial 
understanding of labor-management relations and a model for labor 
peace that is built upon the balance of power rather than a spirit of 
unity.129 
Theoretically, this sounds wonderful.  The problem is that Catholic 
colleges and universities have not modeled the vision Brady offers.  The 
employee groups seeking unionization have done so because Catholic 
colleges and universities have not offered a cooperative model of collective 
bargaining and appear to treat their employees no more lovingly than secular 
institutions of higher learning do.  Six years after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Catholic Bishop, the United States Bishops issued their pastoral 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 81. 
 129.  Id. at 156. 
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letter, Economic Justice for All.130  In it, the bishops recognized the rights of 
workers of church institutions to organize and bargain collectively.131  
Twenty-eight years later, in their actual labor relations, Catholic universities 
look no different than do secular universities.  “Unfortunately, despite the 
promise of Economic Justice for All, the Church has yet to provide an 
adequate response to its labor relations lacunae created by Catholic 
Bishop.”132 
That it has not done so is troubling.  How effective can Catholic Social 
Teaching be as a guide to the behavior of others if the Catholic entities 
themselves do not practice what the Church teaches about the rights of 
workers?133  Brady acknowledges that Catholic institutions have not lived up 
to the ideal she advances.  Nonetheless she believes it is “important to 
preserve their opportunity to try.”134 
Brady’s argument counsels in favor of giving wide berth to religious 
institutions so as to afford them a chance to live up to their ideals.  To forego 
the aims of the NLRA, however, where an institution shows no signs of 
 130.  UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/upload/economic_justice_for_all.pdf. 
 131.  Id. at 86 (“All church institutions must also fully recognize the rights of employees to 
organize and bargain collectively with the institution through whatever association or organization 
they freely choose.”); see also United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Office of Social 
Development & World Peace, A Fair and Just Workplace: Principles and Practices for Catholic 
Health Care (Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.catholiclabor.org/hospital/ 
workplace.htm [hereinafter A Fair and Just Workplace] (stating that the “core of Catholic teaching in 
this area is that it is up to workers—not bishops, managers, union business agents, or management 
consultants—to exercise the right to decide through a fair and free process how they wish to be 
represented in the workplace.  Workers may decide to be represented by a union or not to be 
represented.  Catholic teaching respects their decision”). 
 132.  David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, The First Amendment and the Labor Relations of 
Religiously-Affiliated Employers, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 449, 456–57 (1999).  Gregory and Russo find 
the failure of the Church to respond to be “theologically scandalous.”  Id. at 466.  They lament: 
How is it that despite more than a century of unequivocal social teaching recognizing the 
dignity of all workers, including those in Church-affiliated institutions to organize and 
bargain collectively, some persons in Church leadership positions seek recourse to 
secular civil law to trump Church teaching?  If the Church, as a major employer in the 
United States, is going to give effective witness to the social and moral teachings that it 
eloquently professes, then it must do more than provide pro-forma lip-service to the 
rights of its employees who wish to organize and bargain collectively. 
Id. 
 133.  Talking about the Manhattan College case, an organizer for the New York State United 
Teachers observed, “This is a college that talks about being committed to social justice.  Well, its 
adjuncts need some social justice.”  Scott Jaschik, Church vs. Adjunct Union, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Nov. 12, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/11/12/manhattan. 
 134.  See Brady, supra note 95, at 81. 
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implementing a richer vision of employer-employee relations and its 
treatment of its employees is such that employees seek the protection of 
federal labor laws seems to ask too much.  At best, Brady has a good 
argument for the NLRB to refrain from stepping into a situation where a 
Catholic college or university has already taken steps to set up an alternative 
collective bargaining regime. 
 At a more basic level, however, I am not convinced Brady is correct that 
the application of federal labor laws would impede the ability of Catholic 
colleges and universities to model a more collaborative approach to 
collective bargaining.135  The example of Catholic hospitals is instructive. 
 Although not-for-profit hospitals were originally covered by the NLRA, 
they were excluded from coverage by the Taft-Hartley amendments.  When 
the issue of the removal of that exemption was being considered, the 
Catholic Hospital Association did not lobby for exclusion of Catholic 
hospitals from NLRA coverage.  Instead, it supported the application of the 
NLRA to all employees in the health care industry, including employees of 
Catholic hospitals, subject only to provisions that would protect against the 
effects of strikes and work stoppages.136  When Congress ultimately 
amended the NLRA in 1974 to cover the health care industry,137 it contained 
no special provisions relating to religious hospitals, protecting only those 
who had conscientious objection to union membership.138 
Catholic hospitals are thus subject to the NLRA and to NLRB 
jurisdiction just as other hospitals.  This does not prevent Catholic hospitals 
from approaching labor relations in the way Brady suggest and modeling a 
more collaborative and cooperative approach.  At the time the 1974 
amendments were put in place, the Catholic Hospital Association indicated 
that Catholic hospitals would “fairly recognize the rights of employees to 
organize, but at the same time [would] exercise appropriate management 
mechanisms to educate and motivate employees to the problems of health 
care administration, of public service, and of the financial realities of the 
industry.”139  A statement of its board of trustees indicated a recognition of 
the obligation to furnish equitable terms and conditions of employment and 
 135.  They may even help.  In the real world, one might question whether it is possible to have a 
truly collaborative model without the threat of legal sanctions as a back-up. 
 136.  Eugene J. Schulte, Union Organization in Catholic Hospitals, 21 CATH. LAW. 332, 332–34 
(1975).  Indeed, it appears that the Catholic Hospital Association was in favor of NLRA coverage of 
hospitals before other hospital representatives came on board.  See id. at 334. 
 137.  Health Care Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (current version at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1974)). 
 138.  Cathy Schatz Glazer, Comment, Labor Relations in the Health Care Industry—The Impact 
of the 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 54 TUL. L. REV. 416, 
433–34 (1980). 
 139.  Schulte, supra note 136, at 336. 
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to observe standards of enlightened personnel practices.140  In 1999, the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) affirmed the rights 
of employees in Catholic hospitals to unionize.141 
More recently, the Committee on Domestic Justice and Human 
Development of the USCCB published a document of options and guidance 
on the subject of Catholic health care and unions.142  The document explores 
how the social teachings of the Catholic Church “should shape the actions of 
unions, management and others in assuring workers a free and fair choice on 
questions of representation in the workplace.”143  It aims at encouraging 
dialogue between unions and employers and replacing conflict and 
contention with more cooperative attitudes.  The document sets forth the 
principles for a fair and just organizing model “based on mutual respect, 
equal access to truthful communications, and freedom from coercion.”144 
The USCCB’s document is no guarantee that there will not be 
difficulties between employers and unions; clearly there have been disputes 
over the years.145  However, it does suggest that the NLRB’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over Catholic employers does not prevent the institution from 
developing and modeling a non-adversarial approach to labor relations. 
V.  SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR THE NLRB 
If one accepts, as I argued earlier, that Catholic Bishop does not divest 
the NLRB of jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities, the NLRB 
is free to continue with a flexible approach in determining whether to 
exercise jurisdiction over such institutions.  That approach should seek to 
protect both the religious freedom of the institutions and the policy in favor 
of unionization embodied in federal labor law.  At one extreme, it would not 
be sufficiently protective of the interest of religious colleges and universities 
to say that the NLRB should always exercise jurisdiction over faculty efforts 
to unionize.  At the other, the D.C. Circuit’s Great Falls test is insufficiently 
 140.  Statement by the Catholic Hospital Ass’n Board of Trustees Concerning Employer-
Employee Relations, reprinted in Schulte, supra note 136, at 337. 
 141.  A Fair and Just Workplace, supra note 131. 
 142.  See generally United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on Domestic Justice 
and Human Development, Respecting the Just Rights of Workers: Guidance and Options for 
Catholic Healthcare and Unions (June 22, 2009), available at http://old.usccb.org/sdwp/national/ 
respecting_the_just_rights_of_workers.pdf. 
 143.  Id. at 1. 
 144.  Id. at 8. 
 145.  Gregory & Russo, supra note 132, at 456–57. 
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protective of federal labor policy and insulates religious colleges and 
universities more than necessary, never allowing faculty at religious colleges 
and universities to avail themselves of the protection of federal labor laws. 
A better approach would be for the NLRB to determine whether to 
exercise jurisdiction over Catholic colleges and universities based on an 
analysis of factors counseling in favor of or against its doing so.  That is, 
instead of putting the focus of the analysis on the religiosity of the 
institution, the focus ought to be more directly on the competing interests.146 
The discussion in Part IV of this Article suggests several relevant factors 
to consider as a means of ensuring that the NLRB does not exercise 
jurisdiction in a situation where there is a significant risk of entanglement or 
of infringement on a religious college or university’s ability to offer an 
alternative means of achieving the goals sought to be achieved by federal 
law. 
First, the fact that the unit seeking representation is composed of full-
time faculty is a factor counseling against the NLRB’s exercise of 
jurisdiction.  In contrast, the fact that the unit seeking representation is 
composed of adjunct faculty is a factor counseling in favor of the NLRB’s 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
Second, the fact that faculty seeking representation are faculty in a 
seminary, with a primary task of preparing students to enter the priesthood 
or other ordained ministry, should be a dispositive factor counseling against 
the NLRB’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
Third, the fact that a religious college or university has chosen to be 
accredited by a regional accreditation agency, thereby voluntarily subjecting 
itself to the regulation created by such accreditation is a factor counseling in 
favor of the exercise of jurisdiction by the NLRB. 
Fourth, the fact that a religious college or university is voluntarily 
engaging in collective bargaining with a faculty unit should counsel against 
the NLRB exercising jurisdiction. Where a religious university is 
endeavoring to implement a vision of employer-employee relations 
consistent with its religious principles, the NLRB should not attempt to 
supplant those principles by application of federal law. 
 146.  In its amicus brief in Manhattan College, the American Federation of Labor & Congress of 
Industrial Organizations proposes a different alternative test, suggesting that the determinative 
question is “whether the faculty members in the petitioned-for unit perform a religious function.”  
AFL-CIO Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 3.  Manhattan College argued in its reply brief that that 
inquiry would also be constitutionally infirm.  Manhattan Coll.’s Response to Amicus Curiae Brief 
of the Am. Fed. of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. & the Am. Fed. of Teachers, AFL-CIO at 11, 
Manhattan Coll., No. 2-RC-23543, 2011 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 94 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 10, 2011), 
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 09031d45807146c9 (filed on Nov. 14, 
2011). 
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One can perhaps conceive of other factors that would be relevant.  My 
aim here is not to present an exhaustive list, but rather, to find an alternative 
means of determining when the protection of federal labor laws is both 
necessary for the protection of employees and consistent with First 
Amendment protections.  That aim suggests a flexible approach that would 
also include allowing either party to offer evidence to support its view that 
jurisdiction would or would not create excessive risks to an institution’s 
religious freedom. 
I acknowledge there is no guarantee that tensions will never arise in 
situations where the NLRB exercises jurisdiction over collective bargaining 
at religious colleges and universities.  There may be reasons over time to 
impose some limits on the scope of collective bargaining with such 
institutions, as some states have done in the past.  But the fact that tensions 
may arise that may need to be resolved is not a reason, in all circumstances, 
to deprive employees of such institutions of the protection of federal labor 
laws. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There are some who view the NLRB’s recent decisions involving 
Manhattan College and St. Xavier to be part of an attack on religious liberty.  
Others view it as a consequence of religious colleges and universities having 
become too secular over time, using the decisions as a means for pushing 
such institutions to be more sectarian. 
The point here is not to disfavor religious colleges and universities who 
have adopted a more acculturated model of education.147  It is to find a 
reasonable way to respect the freedom of a religious institution to carry out 
its religious mission without interference by the government and without 
exempting such institutions from laws that do no violence to that religious 
mission.  Catholic colleges and universities should not have the freedom to 
treat employees in a way that would not be tolerated of a secular college and 
university unless application of the labor laws of the United States would 
cause a serious infringement of their religious freedom.  Religious freedom 
should not provide a shield that allows religious colleges and universities to 
 147.  Tom Berg has argued that law should not skew a church-affiliated organization’s choice 
between different models of mission.  Thomas C. Berg, Christianity and the Secular in Modern 
Public Life, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 425, 425–34 (2005).  Moving away from a focus on the religiosity 
of the institution and toward the factors I have suggested may have the added benefit of reducing 
that danger. 
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deny their employees the benefits of collective bargaining so they can freely 
behave in an economically self-interested manner. 
 
